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THE RIGHT TO CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION 
MICHAEL fRENDO 
1. AN ANALYSIS OF THE RIGHT 
Conscientious objection is the assertion of moral conviction as 
a basis for defiance of what the law prescribes. It is an inner feel-
ing of moral obligation not to comply with legal norms which you 
consider wrong; a refusal to aid, or participate in, acts which to 
you are morally reprehensible. The conscientious objector re-evokes 
the words of Henry Thoreau: 
'I do not lend myself to .the wrong which I condemn'. 
It is within this delicate field of conscience and of morality that 
we have to venture in order to attempt an analysis of the right to 
conscientious obj ectian. Conscientious objection is a term that 
lends itself to wide application and it must be stated at the very 
outset that we shall restrict the meaning of the term to the refusal 
to bear arms in clear contravention of th,e law of the country. 
This is a conflict situation par excellence. Indeed it is a situa-
tion of acute conflict for the very physical existence of a society 
may be put in question. We shall see that the circumstances within 
which the right to conscientious objection may exist, could be cru-
cial to its legal recognition or otherwise. Thus the problem varies 
in its gravity according to the context in which it is seen: from 
peacetime to wartime, from a totalitarian state to a democracy. 
Conscientious objection to military service creates, as Ginsberg 
puts it, 'a tragic situation in which right clashes with right' • 1 It is 
a direct confrontation between an individual and the society in 
which he lives, with the individual's only line of defence being 
his conscience. The mere readiness of a society to consider an ar-
gument based exclusively on conscientious objection, truly reveals 
the unique respect that such society has for this 'inner voice' (as 
Gandhi used to call it) that exists within every human being. The 
conscientious objector, by the very stand that he takes, is assert-
ing that his personal moral objections bear more weight than the 
reasons for obedience of the law. The political source of the law 
is, therefore, extremely important as a guide while tracking this 
rugged path of moral reasoning that leads to the final individual 
1 Ginsberg.Morris, On Justice in Society (1971), p.241. 
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decision. An individual living in a totalitarian society where the 
lawis an imposition, where he does not enjoy any sufficient means 
to change the government, will find it quite easy to justify breach 
of the law on the grounds of conscientious objection - without hav-
ing any qualms of conscience. Though . even in this case he may 
have to distinguish between the duty to defend the fatherland, if 
such. a duty exists, and a refusal to defend a political system to 
which .he does not adhere. The conflict situation in a democratic 
society is basically different, and even more delicate. Here govern-
ment rules by will of the majority, and enactment of the law must 
be seen as an expression of such .will. Moreover, in this case, the 
individual does have means, provided by the law itself, to convince 
the majority of his point of view and to change the government of 
his country. A moral justification of disobedience, a balance bet-
ween the liberty of conscience and the duty to respect the social 
right, is even more difficult to find in a democratic society. 
One solution .would be for the conscientious objector to adopt an 
attitude of classic non-violent passive resistance and break the 
law accepting the submissior. of the legal consequences. This 
would not be a solution found by balancing right with right, This 
would be an unquestioned preponderance of the social right through 
the total renunciation of the right of the individual. And the social 
conscience of most democratic societies is not satisfied by such 
resolution of the conflict. 
On the other hand national communities usually also assert that 
the defence of the fatherland is a duty. incumbent on every citizen. 
And such defence is the raison d'etre of conscription legislation. 
However, there has developed an attitude that such a duty is not 
an absolute one and that, in the interest of a more tolerant and just 
society, the extent of its operation is to be retrenched by the exi s-
tence of a sphere within which .the right to conscientious objection 
may be exercised. The balance to be reached is a very fine one, 
and a change in circumstances may immediately unbalance the re-
lationship between the right and the duty. 
In view of all this, there seems to be a kind of proportionality 
between the recognition of the right to conscientious objection and 
the degree of hazard that such recognition entails for society. Thus 
itis easier to envisage a right to conscientious objectio.n in peace-
time than in wartim.e, especially if it happens to be a defensive 
war. Ironically, of course, wartime is the period when the con-
scientious objection of the individual is most pronounced. Data re-
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lacing to the states which .recognise conscientious objection as a 
valid basis for exemption from military service, shows that the 
right has not been exercised extensiv.ely. In the Federal Republic 
of Germany, where there is perhaps the most advanced type of le-
gislation on conscientious objection, the right has been exercised 
by only 0.83 of those called for service with the armed forces. In 
Austria, the percentage stands at 0.063. 2 What would happen if the 
percentages suddenly soared? The military defence programme of 
a country could suddenly be gravely hampered if not totally para-
lysed. The situation seems to be analogous to the question of le-
gality of homosexuality. When homosexuality is at a low level, the 
hazard of extinction of a .society is practically non-existent, just 
as fear of insufficient defence is unfounded when conscientious ob-
jectors amount to less than one per cent of persons called up for 
military training. Let us now envisage a situation, hypothetical and 
not likely to occur, where the rate of homosexuality reaches such a · 
peak that the life of that society is endangered: would the right 
subsist? All this is indicative of the negative pressures that the 
right to conscientious objection is bound to suffer were it to prove 
a danger to the existence of the same society within which it func-
tions. 
The law of proportionality exists also on another level, that is, 
between the degree of moral conviction of the individual and the 
recognition granted by the law to the right of conscientious objec-
tion. As will become even more clear iri our exposition of the legal 
situation in particular countries, it is easy to ascertain a blatant 
tendency to distinguish between the various types of moral argu-
ments raised as a justification for objection. Thus, for objectors 
to be recognised as possessing the right to exemption from military 
service, they are usually expected to show conviction of a rejec-
tion of armed force. Hardly any country considers conscientious 
objection to a particular war as a valid ground for exemption. 
The reason is certainly not for lack of sincerity, for objection to 
a particular war can be equally conscientious as that to violence 
or to destruction: the objector may refuse to participate in a war 
which he considers as aggressive, or .in which nuclear weapons 
will be used. Indeed, one writer asserts, absolute objection seems 
2 Council of Europe, Report on the Right of Conscientious Obje.ction, Do-
cument 2170 (Rappor.teur: Mr. Bauer), IV. Explanatory Memorandum by Mr. 
Bauer, (1967), p. B. 
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to be less reasonable than objection to a particular war. 3 · 
It seems, however, that the case of the total pacifist, or of per-
sons of similar belief, exacts more respect and consequently more 
tolerance from the social conscience, than the case of other objec-
tors. 
Another reason could be that, were governments to allow exemp-
tion on the basis of particular conscientious objection, the hazard 
involved would increase since a great number of people would qua-
lify. Thus we realise chat in the case of objectors to particular . 
wars of violence, both instances of proportionality that we have 
mentioned, come into play. The scales here tend to weigh .down in 
favour of the duty of defence and the social right of self-preserva-
tion. 
Is our analysis of conscientious objection an attempt to establish . 
the existence or inexistence of a new right? Or does the right to 
conscientious objection exist veiled behind rights already legally 
recognised by many nations? 
'All persons in Malta shall have full freedom of conscience and 
enjoy the free exercise of their respective mode of religious wor-
ship'. Article 31 (1) of the Malta 1964 Constitution states a prin-
ciple chat is endorsed by the Constitutions of many states in the 
world. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights in article 18 re-
cognises that: 
'Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or 
belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others 
and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in 
teaching, practice, worship and observance.' 
Article 9.1 of the European Convention on Human Rights reaf-
firms the existence of the right in exactly the same words of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. As regards the European 
Convention it is worth noting that in the Parliamentary Conference 
on Human Rights (Vienna, 18-20 October 1971) the right of con-
scientious objection was referred to as an additional right to be 
suggested for inclusion in the Convention. 4 This is, to my mind, 
3Singer Peter, Democracy and Disobedience. 
4 Council of Europe, Report on the Parliamentary Conference on Human 
Rights, Document 3078,. (Rapporteur: Mr • . van der Stoel), (] a.ouary 1972), 
pp. 6, 7: paragraphs 13. 14. 
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incorrect. The right to conscientious objection is but a corollary 
of the broader right inherent in man: the right of freedom of con· 
science. Religious belief and its expression does not merely en-
tail freedom of worship in a material way. It entails the right to be-
lieve in a set of values, the right to propagate their. acceptance 
and the freedom to live them. Conscientious objection is the result 
of adherence to values which treasure life to such an extent that 
aggression, violence, destruction, are plain stark anathema. To 
dissect the spiritual in man and separate conscience from belief is 
a task that goes beyond the Herculean. The existence of the right 
to freedom of conscience and the right to conscientious objection 
is one and homogeneous. We can thus in reality only speak of con-
scientious objection as an extension of the right to freedom of con-
science, since they are essentially one and the same right. In this 
conclusion I am, after all, comforted by a resolution of the Consul-
tative Assembly of the Council of Europe itself, which states, inter 
alia: 
'2. This right shall be regarded as deriving logically from the 
fundamental rights of the individual in democratic Rule of Law 
States which are guaranteed in Article 9 of the European Con-
vention on Human Rights. ' 5 
The right to freedom of conscience is thus to be regarded as 
comprising within itself the right to conscientious objection and 
recognition of the latter is not the creation of a new right but mere-
ly an extension of the legal application of the former. Most consti-
tutions guarantee freedom of conscience and this provides a rich 
source of derivation for the right co conscientious objection. 
2. RECOGNITION OF THE RIGHT 
Legal recognition of the right has not as yet become very wide-
spread on the national level, let alone on the international level. 
Many countries still regard the duty of defence as so overwhelming 
as to leave no room for exemption to individual convictions to the 
contrary. We shall discu~s the legal situation in four countries pri· 
marily: the Federal Republic of Germany, Sweden, Italy and Malta. 
Of these four, Malta is the only nation without compulsory military 
service, while the Federal Republic of Germany is the only state 
5 Resolution 337 (1967) on the right to conscientious objection, Consulta-
tive Assembly of the Council of. Europe. 
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that has the right to conscientious objection firmly recognised in 
its Basic Law. Sweden and Italy recognise the right but only through 
ordinary legislation. 
Thus we realise the wide divergence of opinion as regards the 
protection by law of chis right. Even in the countries where protec-
tion is given, the degree with which it.is given reveals whether the 
acceptance of the right is a full and mature acceptance or whether 
social prejudice ag~inst objectors still persists. 
Let us compare the legal state of the right in Sweden and the 
Federal Republic of Germany. In Sweden various legislation has 
been enacted since 1902, the latest being the Law on Unarmed 
Service 1966. ·Objectors are not exempted from military service: 
they are only given permission to do other service as an alterna-
tive. Thus their work is regarded as part and parcel of the total de-
fence programme of the state. Though legislation regarding the en-
dorsement in law of the right has existed for a long time, we are 
here dealing with ordinary legislation. On the other hand, the right 
in the Federal Republic is protected by the Basic Law of the land. 
Article 4, relating to freedom of creed and conscience, states, in 
subsection (3): 
'No one may be compelled against his conscience to render 
war service involving the use of arms. Details shall be regu-
lated by a federal law'. 
Thus recognition co the right is gran~ed by article 4(3) itself, 
while federal law only serves as a means of its practical applica-
tion. This specific constit1.itional recognition reflects a respect for 
the individual conscience that is equalled only by the Netherlands 
constitution which contains a similar provision. It is also worth 
noting here chat recognition of the right to conscientious objection 
comes within the same article that recognises freedom of con-
science and religion. This seems co support the contention chat 
one is only an extension of the otherr 
In countries recognising the right, the difficulty inevitably aris-
es of denoting the persons entitled to it; that is, who are the con- . 
scientious objectors? In Sweden the right is given to persons who 
are sincerely opposed to performing service to such an extent that 
an attempt to coerce them to do so would lead to a crisis of con-
science. Only universal objection to military .service is accepted 
as a ground for alcernati ve service. 
In the Federal Republic, application of the term 'conscientious' 
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is as wide, if not wider. The Federal Administrative Court regards 
as a conscientious decision, 'any serious moral decision, i.e. any 
decision distinguishing between "good" and "evil" which in a given 
situation an individual regards as binding on himself unconditional-
ly, so that he cannot act in contravention of it without experienc-
ing grave moral distress'. 0 The authorities do not decide the right-
eousness of the objection but simply its genuine conscientious ori-
gin. Thus motivation may be philosophic, political or moral, and is, 
in any case, irrelevant. However the nature of the objection itself 
does count. The Federal Constitutional Court has decided that con-
scientious objection must apply to any armed service. Thus, like 
Sweden, 'conditional' objectors eg. co specific wars, or specific 
enemies, are not exempt from service. Yet it seems that the validi-
ty of this statement is not an absolute one, and though the law of 
proportions we discussed in our analysis of the right is still gene-
rally discernible here, it may be that new currents may render its 
application less un.iversal. Indeed in the United Kingdom, when mi-
litary service was still compulsory, political objectors eg. indivi· 
duals who objected to a particular war, were considered as falling 
within the legal definition of conscientious objectors. The law 
stating this was enacted in 1941. This is a possible way of deve-
lopment for the West German legislation. 
The existence of a conscientious objection has to be ascertain-
ed and this obvious need marshalls us into the delicate sphere of 
evaluation of judgement on that which is most intimate to man: his 
conscience. It is no wonder therefore that for the just application of 
the right there is need for a thorough examination of the individual 
case. Such a preoccupation with justice is reflected in the proce-
dures set up both in Sweden and in the Federal Repubiic. In both 
countries the individual has the possibility of appeal so that his 
case is once more considered and decided upon. In Sweden the 
examining Committee is presided by an ex-judge while in West Ger-
many the chairman must be a magistrate or senior civil servant who 
is over thirty-two years old. Composition of the Committees, of 
course, reflects the seriousness of the issues involved which are 
6 Study on the legal position of conscientious objectors. in the member 
Scares of the Council of Europe presented by the Max Planck Institute for 
Comparative Public Law and International Law, Heidelberg, Appendix to 
Report. on the Right of Conscientious Objection, Council of Europe Docu-
men t 2170, ( 5967), p. 54. 
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apt to be acutely difficult and where legal experience would be a 
help. In Sweden the objector may appeal to the King in State Coun-
cil, which in practice is the Government. In the Federal Republic 
the protection afforded to the citizen is wider. Against the commit-
tee, the conscientious objector has various ways open for him to ap-
peal. He may appeal for a re-examination of his case by the admi-
nistrating authorities; the second decision is taken by a board ad-
hered to a higher authority, the Kreiswehrersatzamt, the competent 
District Recruiting and Replacement Office. Appeal to an Adminis-
trative Court is then open, and following certain procedure, revision 
may be sought from the Federal Administrative Court. Finally, there 
is right of appeal to the Federal Constitutional Court against any 
violation of fundamental rights in the course of proceedings. Thus 
we realise that a miscarriage of justice vis-a-vis the conscientious 
objector is less likely to occur in the Federal Republic where judge-
ment on the issue may be put through a wide process of purification. 
In both Sweden and the Federal Republic, objectors who are 
exempt from military training have to undergo alternative service. 
Immediately, the query arises: does this mean that recognition of 
the right is conditional? Is this a penalty inflicted on the objectors 
in order to exculpate them from the guilt of exemption? Is alterna-
tive service, a consequence of recognition of the right? 
Once more the duty to defend the fatherland comes into play. In 
reality, recognition of the right to conscientious objection only 
means exemption from the rendering of military service to the 
country. It does not exempt from the duty of rendering service to 
the country, and alternative service has, in my view, to be seen in 
this light. The upholding of the right does not automatically mean 
the discarding of the duty to contribute to the defence of state 
through national service. Yet the service rendered by the objectors 
to the country should not be regarded as inferior to that rendered by 
the members of the armed forces. 
Thus the service of the conscientious objectors should corres-
pond to that of regular conscripts. This principle - at least as re-
gards duration - is firmly entrenched in article 12a(2) of the 1949 
Basic Law of the Federal Republic. Article 12a was inserted in the 
Basic Law by federal law of 24 June 1968, and is the article which 
also speaks of compulsory military service for men who have at-
tained the age of eighteen years. In section (2) it reads: 
'A person who refuses, on grounds of conscience, to render 
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war service involving the use of arms may be required to ren-
der a substitute service. The duration of such substitute ser-
vice shall not exceed the duration of military service. Details 
shall be regulated by a law which .shall not interfere with .the 
freedom of conscience and must also provide for the possibili-
ty of a substitute service not connected with .units of the Arm-
ed Forces of the Federal Border Police.' 
This section emphasises the attitude that the work done by ob-
jectors has equal value, in the eyes of the community, as that done 
by the normal conscripts. The situation is different in Swedish law. 
In Sweden, the length of non-combatent service is 540 days while 
the duration of normal military service is 394 days. Conscripts may, 
however, voluntarily do an additional 146 days as part of special 
units. As regards, non-combatants, therefore, the 146 days are ex-
tra and compulsory. This state of affairs reveals a derogatory view 
of the service rendered by non-combatants. This 'penalty' for enjoy" 
ment of the right, is also found in the Italian legislation recognis-
ing the right. In Italy until. 1972 there was obligatory military ser-
vice but no recognition of the right to conscientious objection. No 
mention of the right is made in the Cons citution and moreover, the 
laws relating to national military service left no room for possible 
exemptions or alternative work for objectors. The Constitution in 
article 52 says that: 
'The defence of the fatherland is a sacred duty of the citi-
zen.' .• 
An attempt to include .a form of exemption in the constitutio.n had 
been made in the Constituent Assembly, but it was overruled. 7 
Could the right have been legally derived from exi'sting provi-
sions? Article 19 states that: 
'Everyone has the right to profess freely his own religious be-
lief in any form, individually or collectively, to preach it and 
to worship in public .and in pri v.ate, provided this does not in-
volve rites which offend against public morality'. 
Besides this, Article 21 affirms: 
'Everyone has the right freely to express his thoughts through 
word, writing or other means of communication' 
7 ibid. P• 80. 
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Yet, both article 19 safeguarding religious freedom of conscience 
and article 21 safeguarding a more philosophical freedom of con-
science, were regarded in law as not including the right to dissent 
to military service. The sacred duty of defence of the fatherland 
was considered as overriding and this was supported by the rej ec-
tion of attempts to include recognition of the right in the Consti-
tuent Assembly. The situation was similar to that in Switzerland 
where it is held that religious views will not free citizens from 
their civic duties. 8 
Conscientious objection wa$ considered a desertion of a sacred 
duty and the lack of legislation affording legal protection to the 
right reflected a social attitude of distrust and denigration towards 
conscientious objectors. 
The law approved on December 14th, 1972, changed the legal 
situation. The right to conscientious objection was legally recog-
nised and thus it was realised that the sacred duty to defend the 
fatherland did not necessarily mean direct military defence. Ob-
jectors who satisfy a special tribunal that their case is based on 
'profound religious or philosophical or moral convictions' are now 
granted exemption from military service and are given alternative 
service. The law has strengthened the practical legal value of ar-
ticles 19 and 21 of the Constitution. 
However the past long experience of rejection of legal recogni-
tion of the right have left its imprint on the recognition itself. Thus, 
as in Sweden, the non-military period of conscription is 23 months 
instead of 15. The difference in duration is here harsher than that 
in Sweden, by approximately 94 days. This is undoubtedly a ref-
lection of the unfavourable social view of conscientious objection, 
a view that, up to a few years ago obstructed attempts cowards re-
cognition. 
In Malta the situation is a most happy one since military service 
is not compulsory. This, however, does not mean that there is no 
place for a discussion of the right to conscientious objection in 
Maltese law. The right to freedom of conscience is established in 
article 41 of the Malta Constitution and this is a source of interpre-
8 ibid. p. 131. In Switzerland, on the first of ~larch 1968, new regulations 
for" the treatment of conscientious objectors came into effect. Provision 
was made for a judge co end a sentenced conscientious objector's liabili-
ty for further sen·ice and less severe conditions of detention now apply. 
(Keesings, Contemporary Archives, p. 22550) 
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tation for the right to conscientious objection, were compulsory mi-
litary service to be introduced. Article 41 affirms that: 
'All persons in Malta shall have full freedom of conscience 
and enjoy free exercise of their respective mode of religious 
worship'. 
Not only is interpretation unhindered by any reference to a sacri:d 
duty of defence of the fatherland; it. is aided perhaps, by the refe-
rence to conscientious objection in article 36 relating to protection 
from forced labour: 
'36 ( 1) No person shall be required to perform forced labour. 
(2) For the purposes of this section, the expression "forced 
labour" does not include: 
(c) any labour required of a member of a disciplined force 
in pursuance of his duties as such or, in the case of a 
person who has conscientious objections to service as 
a member of a naval, military or air force, any labour 
that that person is required by law to perform in place of 
such service;' 
It would be preposterous to state that there is here an implicit. 
acceptance of the right to conscientious objection. It seems safe to 
affirm however that the provision sets the stage for acceptance and 
renders the right less of a novelty to local legislation. Mere mention 
of the right in the constitution put us legally in a position more ad-
vanced than many other countri,es. Th~ wording of s36 (2)(c) is 
worth comparing with. that of Anicle 4. 3 (b) of the European Con-
vention on Human Rights .. Article 4. 3 (b) reads : 
'3. For the purposes of this Article the term "forced or com-
pulsory labour" shall not include: 
(b) any service of a military character or, in case of con-
scientious objectors in countries where they are recog-
nised, service exacted instead of compulsory military 
service.' 
The legislators of the Convention felt the need to express clear· 
ly that here reference was being made to countries which already 
recognise the right to conscientious objection. Is it. not strange 
that the question of conscientious objection is mentioned in our 
Constitution where not even military service is compulsory and thus 
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no need for existence of the right arises? One could perhaps deduce 
that the legislator of the Constitution, was perhaps suggesting the 
compatibility of the acceptance of the right to conscientious objec-
tion with the recognition of the right to freedom of conscience and 
religion. But this of course remains in the field of speculation. One 
might safely venture to state, however, that the wording of article 
39 somewhat clears the ground and that together with article 41 
this is a possible germ from which the recognition of the right 
might emerge. 
We have thus considered the four countrie.s we purported to dis-
cuss and though for .the picture to be complete we would have to 
set on a world tour, the four countries we have seen give us a wide 
spectrum of social and legal environments within which the right to 
conscientious objection exists. 
On the international level it is impossible to speak of legal re-
cognition of the right because such recognition does not exist. In-
ternational entities and organisations have however acknowledged 
the existence, or the need for consideratio.n of the existence, of the 
right to conscientious objection to military service. Amnesty Inter-
national is a pioneer in the field and its groups have worked for 
the relief or release of many who suffer because of their conscien-
tious objection. It was also Amnesty International which suggested 
discussion of the topic to the Council of Europe which in cum took 
up the challenge and has done valuable preparatory work. The ques-
tion was discussed extensively in the Council of Europe Consulta-
tive Assembly, in the Vienna Conference on Human Rights of 1971, 
and elsewhere. 
In 1967, the Consultative Assembly approved a resolution (Re-
solution 337) on the right of conscientious objection. The resolu-
tion dwells briefly but concisely on the basic principles involved, 
on procedures to be adopted and on the alternative service. It 
speaks of the right and its logical derivation from article 9 of the 
Convention; it also affirms the need for the decision-making body 
on the conscientious objection to be 'entirely separate from the mi-
litary authorities', and that the applicant should be allowed to be 
represented and call witnesses. As regards alternative service, the 
resolution upholds that: 
'l. The period to be served in alternative work shall be at 
least as long as the period of normal military service. 
2. The social and financial equality of recognised conscien-
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tious objectors and ordinary conscripts shall be guaran-
teed.' ••. 
More emphasis on equality of duration of service should, in my 
view, have been forthcoming, though one has to bear in mind that 
suggestions for international agreement have to be of a minimum 
standard as regards requirements. 
In the report on the Parliamentary Conference on Human Rights, 
inter alia, suggestions revolved round a possible definition of a 
common attitude to conscientious objection, 'with a view to the 
examination of this question at the United Nations', and also pos-
sibly drafting of a European instrument. 9 In the report. on action to 
be taken on the conclusions of the above-mentioned Conference, 
the view is expounded that consideration of the right should lead 
more to a common definition of attitude and perhaps the establish"' 
ment of a European statute for conscientious objectors, then to an 
incorporation of the right in the European Convention on Human 
Rights. 10 This reluctance to introduce it. directly into the Conven-
tion is of course due to the difficulties that radiate from the right to 
conscientious objection as a right, and from its acceptance within 
the law. And at present there appears to be not enough common 
ground among the European states for them to accede on the inter-
national level to the obligation of observing the protection and re.s-
pect of such a right. The need for the delineation of a common 
sphere of agreement as to what is conscientious objection is a pri-
mary one, and also imminent. The drawing up of a statute for con-
scientious objectors should not be regarded as a final aim. It 
should be considered as an intermediate step towards the final in-
corporation. of the right to conscientious objection within the Euro-
pean Convention, as an extension of the right to freedom of con-
science protected by section 9. 
Even in the Universal Declaration of Human rights adopted by 
the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 10th 
1948, no explicit reference is made to the right to conscientious ob-
jection. Article 18 however speaks in terms which, as in other in-
stances, leave room for interpretation: 
9 Council of Europe, Report on Parliamentary Conference on Human Rights, 
Document 3078, ( 1972 Jan), p. 26, (Appendix III). 
1°Council of Europe, Report on action to be taken on the conclusions of 
the Parliamentary Conference on Human Rights (Vienna 18-20 October 
1971), (Rapporteur: Mr. Grieve), (October 1972), pp. 11, 12. 
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'Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or 
belief, and freedom, either alone or .in community with others 
and in public or pri'late, to manifest his religion or belief in 
teaching, practice, worship and observance'. 
Conscientious objection is nothing less than observance of one's 
belief, and thus falls within the definition of the right as divulged 
here. The effect of the Universal Declaration of course is not a le-
gal one and the obligation for its observance is only a moral one. 
The major churches too have altered their attitude to conscien-
tious objection and the Second Vatican Council. in a resolution 
urged that 'laws make human provision for the case of those, who, 
for reasons of conscience, refuse to bear arms'. 11 
The tide towards acceptance of the right seems to be favourable 
but as yet, on the international level, legal recognition of the right 
to conscientious objection is still forthcoming. 
3. DISCRIMINATION IN RECOGNITION 
Most constitutions which recognise fundamental human rights, in-
cluding the right to freedom of conscience, also uphold that: 
'The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms ... shall be secured 
without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, co-
lour, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or 
other status.' 
This is taken from article 14 of the Convention on Human rights 
and is meant as an illustration of similar provisions that exist in 
national constitutions and international instruments. The principle 
is embodied in section 33 of the Malta Constitution, in s3 of 
the Italian Constitution, and in s2 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. 
It is a fact that in countries where the right to conscientious ob-
jection is not recognised, ministers of the Protestant and Roman 
Catholic churches espedally, are usually exempt from rendering 
military service. This is undoubtedly based on the profession of 
love and non-violence that such persons manifest through their re-
11Hill Christopher, (editor), for Amnesty International, Rights and Wrongs: 
May Patricia, Conscientious Objection, pp. 121-145. 
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ligious life. This exemption, however, does not extend to other re-
ligious groups of individuals. In Spain, for example, ministers of 
the Jehovah Witnesses - unlike ministers of the Roman Catholic 
Church - are imprisoned each time they con sci en tiously re fuse to 
undergo military training. 12 The same problem arose in the Federal 
Republic of Germany, that is, in a country where the right is recog-
nised and alternative service is provided. Jehovah Witnesses in that 
country asked to be granted the same treatment as that accorded to 
priests of the Protestant and Roman Catholic churches. The Feder-
al Administrative Court held in several judgements that there ex-
ists no similarity between the office of the ministers of these cults 
and that of priests of the two great churches. 13 However convenient 
this solution may be, it is still, to my mind, a case of outright dis-
crimination. Freedom of conscience and its equal application is 
here put in issue. In actual fact the exemption accorded to minis-
ters of those churches is based on respect for their beliefs and the 
expression of such beliefs in their way of living. The right to free-
dom of conscience is. not the exclusive province of some religions: 
it is the right of all religious cults, indeed of all individuals. If it 
is recognised for one then it should be recognised for the other. 
It would be interesting to consider the si.tuation in Italy, preced-
ing the legal recognition of the right in 1972. A discussion of this 
pre-recognition state of the law is relevant in that it serves as a 
guide for any analysis of the legal situation in countries, such as 
Spain, where the right is not recognised buc,similar constitutional 
or other legal provisions exist. 
The question of equality draws our attention to two constitution-
al provisions of great relevance: 
Article 3: 
'All citizens have equal social dignity and are equal in law, 
without distinction as to sex, race, language, religion, politi-
cal opinion, personal and social condition.' 
We have already expressed arguments that apply also to this sec-
tion. It is worth noting however that s3 has been used already by 
the Italian Constitutional Court as a means of modifying existing 
legal situations considered incompatible with the principles it 
enunciates. Thus article 781, of the Civil Code, for example, deal-
12 ibid. 
13 Council of Europe, Document 2170 cit. at (6), P· 75. 
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ing with donations between spouses and remniscent of the Lex Cin-
cia in Roman Law, was declared unconstitutional on 27th June of 
1973, one ground being incompatibility with .article 3 of the Con-
stitution. The potential in this article is thus amply illustrated. 
But perhaps no constitutional article can be as specific and as 
relevant to discrimination as article 8: 
'All religious confessions are equally free in law'. 
This means exactly what it says: there is equal freedom for all 
religious confessions and such equality must necessarily include 
equal freedom to comply with principles in which adherents to a 
particular confession believe. What was good for Roman Catholic 
priests in Italy should also have been good for ministers of other 
professions. Indeed it should have been good for all individuals 
who conscientiously objected. Why should we differentiate? Are 
not they all entitled to freedom of conscience in law? 
There are countries which still do not recognise the right to 
conscientious objection and then adopt this type of half-measures 
in favour of particular groups. There are also states which recog-
nise the right but, notwithstanding this, give preferential treatment 
to certain groups. Both classes are guilty of discrimination. Exempt· 
ing certain religious groups from military training is an implicit re-
cognition of their right to conscientious objection and an affirma-
tion, in their regard, of the right to freedom of conscience. Deny-
ing the extension of such exemption is, in reality, denying the 
equal enjoyment, by other individuals or groups, of the right to ex-
press through their lives the maxims in which they believe. 
The situation in Malta as elsewhere seems to be safeguarded by 
section 33 of the constitution which pledges no discrimination on 
various grounds, including religion. It would be interesting to con-
sider the effect which a declaration that the official religion of the 
island is the Roman Catholic re_ligion would have were compulsofy 
conscription to be introduced. Would this mean automatic and ex-
clusive exemption to ministers of the Roman Catholic church as 
priests of the official state religion? This is assuming that no right 
to conscientious objection is recognised, for all. As regards this 
part on discrimination in recognition I would like, finally, to touch 
once more on an argument already expressed. I am referring to the 
question of alternative service by conscientious objectors, and whe-
ther this is to be regarded as a consequence of recognition or as a 
consequence of a duty to contribute to the social good. Let us ac-
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cept the argument that alternative service is the result of the duty 
towards the existence of the state. This would immediately present 
us with a picture of sexual discrimination. Alternative service has 
to be performed only by male citizens. In an age where there is 
justly, a widespread cry for the emancipation of women and for the 
removal of sexual discrimination, is not the compulsion of alterna-
tive service only on male citizens, an example of discrimination? 
The duty towards the good of the community is equally shared by 
both sexes alike and the kind of work allotted to conscientious ob-
jectors (eg. hospital work; clerical work) is surely not beyond the 
physical capacity of female citizens. The duty to defend the state 
as a duty requiring extra contributions to the community is a duty 
incumbent on all alike. The impediment for conscientious objectors 
to achieve this through training in arms, lies in their conscience; 
that of women lies, it is said, in their. nature. Thus both should be 
given the opportunity to fulfill their duty in ways which they can 
follow. The discrimination would thus be healed. 
4 • .THE MEANING OF RECOGNITION 
Acceptance of rhe right to conscientious objection is closely 
connected to personal attitudes and beliefs about the nature of man. 
The widespread rejection of armed force by the international com· 
munity thus reveals a change in attitude that also reflects favourably 
on the possibility of acceptance of conscientious objection. Un· 
fortunately the idea of aggression as a basic human instinct still 
exists and as one author puts it, 'refusal to fight is felt, conscious· 
ly or unconsciously, to be not quite normal, or even cowardly . .i4 
Suffice it to quote an Italian military court: 
'To be and to feel a man is equivalent to feeling the Father· 
land within oneself and to be moved by the idea of its value 
and the will to see it. perpetuated.' 15 
Recognition of the right to -conscientious objection means a re· 
jection of this idea of man and manlihood. It means an affirmation 
of the loving qualities of humanity, a declaration of abhorrence to 
war and violence, an upholding of the pacifist in man. Such recog-
nition would signify a humane development in the law as a reflec-
14 Hill Christopher, opus cit. at (11). 
15 Council of Europe, Doc. 2170 cit. at (6), p. 88. Th is is taken from a 
Court judgement in the days when no legal recognition was granted. 
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tion of a better understanding and greater respect by the social 
conscience for the freedom of the individual to conduct his life in 
conformity with what he professes to believe. 
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ACTIONS •IN REM' AND 
gXCLUSIVE JURISCdCTION CLAUSES 
J.M. GANADO 
IT is my intention in the present Article to deal with one particular 
aspect of exclusive jurisdiction clauses. As a rule, the Courts 
have given effect to such dauses, independently of the point as to 
whether the jurisdiction of the Maltese Courts is thereby extended 
or derogated from. However, the point has arisen as to whether in 
the presence of such a clause, the Court still possesses a discre· 
ticin to exercise jurisdiction, if it considers that the clause is 
being made use of in bad faith or, at least, in order to try to cir-
cumvent the rights of others. This particular point was discussed 
ex professo in a case 'Qr~J;:dwarf!J?enech Adami rioe. vs. Arsemis 
Christos noe.' which was withdrawn on the 9th June, 1972 before 
the Court of Appeal as the parties had arrived at an amicable com-
promise. In the absence of the judgment of the Court of Appeal, it 
becomes doubly useful to examine in some detail the main points 
that were discussed iri that case. 
A. consignmeat of cigarettes had been loaded on a ship with a 
Panamanian registration for delivery to consignees iri Yugoslavia. 
Plaintiff alleged that the cigarettes had never been delivered to 
the consignees and, after having obtained from the Court the issue 
of an impediment of departure against the ship, claimed payment of 
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